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Abstract
abspara0010 Populism is a concept applied to a wide range of political movements and actors across the globe. There is, at the same time,
considerable confusion about the attributes and manifestation of populism, as well as its impact on democracy. This
contribution identifies the defining elements of the populist ideology and discusses the varieties in which populismmanifests
itself, for instance as a component of certain party families. We finally discuss various normative interpretations of populism,
and the tension between populism and liberal democratic values.
p0015 The Russian Narodniki movement of the 1860–70s is mostly
seen as the first appearance of modern populism. This short-
lived grassroots movement of intellectuals never achieved
mass adherents but represented a radical articulation of the
idea that wisdom resides with the common people and that
socialism should be based on the traditional peasantry as its
heartland (
bib21
Taggart, 2000). American populism, beginning in
the 1880s and continuing particularly in the South throughout
the twentieth century, also referred to themes of moral decay,
conspiracy, and betrayal of the ordinary people by the corrupt
elite. The history of American populism could be portrayed as
reactionary and a nativist movement of great ‘democratic
promise’ (Goodwyn, 1976). In addition, Latin American
populism of the mid-twentieth century has received much
attention. The emphasis was on nation-building under
a centralized and charismatic leadership (see
bib24
Weyland, 2001;
bib18
Roberts, 2006). From the 1980s, there is a resurgence
throughout the world of movements and leaders that have
been dubbed populist. These include, for instance Collor,
Menem, Chavez, Obrador in Latin America; Le Pen, Haider,
Wilders, Dewinter in Western Europe; Buchanan, Perot,
Manning in the United States and Canada; Hanson in Australia;
and Meciar, Milosevic, Lukashenko, Orbán in post-communist
states. The populist label has been attached to a variety of
political movements. It has been used as a term of approbation
only by some movements themselves and mostly as a pejora-
tive term by critics.
s0010 Populism: Mobilization, Leadership, Style,
or Ideology?
p0020 The core idea of populism rests with the claim to represent or
act in the name of the people, understood as the ‘common
people’ and the ‘silent majority.’ Nevertheless, the main
problem of defining populism is that most conceptualizations
encompass very different traits, while analysts apply the term to
diverse phenomena. One approach suggests that populism is
essentially a strategy of political mobilization using a typical style
of political rhetoric (Kazin, 1995). It considers populism to be
a tool for a leader to seek and exercise power. Populist parties
and leaders appeal to the power of the common people to
challenge the legitimacy of the current political establishment.
A second approach focuses on populism as a type of organi-
zation and a style of politics. Populism presents itself not as an
ordinary party characterized by different factions and an appeal
to a specific section of society, but as a unified bloc or move-
ment of the people. The movement is characterized by a poli-
tics of personality centered on a strong, personalized, even
charismatic leader who is said to embody the will of the
common people and who is able to speak on their behalf. The
leader–mass linkage is direct, rather than mediated by organi-
zations. As a result, populist framing is linked to a particular
style of communication (Tarchi, 2002). Populism utilizes an
antitheoretical rhetoric and antiintellectual oratory to exploit
feelings of resentment politically (
bib5
Betz, 1994;
bib1
Abts, 2012).
Populists offer simplistic solutions to complex political prob-
lems in a very direct and demagogic language, appealing to the
common sense of the people and denouncing the intellectu-
alism of the established elites. Although charismatic leadership
and simplistic language might be associated with populism,
these action frames could only be understood as expressions of
an underlying populist ideology. However, populism needs to
be understood as a thin-centered ideology because it does not
provide a comprehensive vision of society (
bib12
Mudde, 2004;
bib2
Abts
and Rummens, 2007;
bib20
Stanley, 2008). It only gives a precise
meaning and priority to certain key concepts of political
discourse, thereby generating a certain ideological picture of
parts of the political domain.
s0015The Elements of the Populist Ideology
p0025Populism is intrinsically “a thin-centered ideology which
advocates the sovereign rule of the people as a homogeneous
body” (
bib2
Abts and Rummens, 2007: p. 409). Three elements of
populist ideology are recurrently highlighted in the literature.
First, it is argued that populism revolves around a central
antagonistic relationship between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite.’ Popu-
lism is an “appeal to ‘the people’ against both the established
structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of
society” (
bib7
Canovan, 1999: p. 3). The establishment is attacked
for its alleged privileges, its corruption, and especially, for its
lack of accountability to the people. Elites are accused
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of representing only their own interests and of being
alienated from the real interests, values, and opinions of the
common man.
p0030 Secondly, populism tries to give power back to the people
and restore popular sovereignty. Populists believe that politics
should be based on the immediate expression of the general will
of the people. They speak and behave as if “democracy meant
the power of the people and only the power of the people”
(Mény and Surel, 2002: p. 9). Populist ideology favors more
direct forms of democracy, such as majority rule or referenda,
which should replace current representative and intermediary
institutional arrangements. Thereby, the will of the people is
considered to be transparent and immediately accessible to
those willing to listen to the vox populi. Thus, populism is wary of
compromise and accommodation, and emphasizes the need for
a politics of will and decision (Urbinati, 1998: pp. 116–118). As
a consequence, there is no need for elaborate discussion or party
politics, and populist movements and parties are often headed
by charismatic leaders who can speak and act directly on behalf
of the people. Populist democracy can be understood as an
attempt to achieve an immediate identity of governed and
governing. Populists claim to present and proclaim, not to re-
present, the essentialist will of the people. In this way, popu-
lism opts for the idea of popular sovereignty, if necessary, at the
expense of constitutional guarantees.
p0035 Thirdly, the transparency of the will of the people is possible
because populism conceptualizes the people as a homogeneous
unity (
bib2
Abts and Rummens, 2007). In populist ideology, ‘the
people’ functions as a central signifier, which receives a funda-
mentally monolithic interpretation. The people are united and
indivisible, fully formed, self-aware, and identifiable by the
majority of numbers. Accordingly, the people are not seen as
a heterogeneous collection of social groups and individual
subjects with diverse values, needs, and opinions. On the basis
of a supposed shared identity, the people are considered to
form a collective body, which is capable of having a common
will and a single interest and which is able to express this will
and to take decisions (Canovan, 2002: p. 34). Populist ideol-
ogy, however, only implies that the people constitute a homo-
geneous body, it does not say what this substantive identity
should be. All actual populist movements need to supplement
their thin-centered populist ideology with additional values
and beliefs that give content to this substantive unity. Popu-
lism, then, cohabits with other, more comprehensive ideolo-
gies depending on the context and the values of the heartland
to which it appeals. Paradigmatic possibilities here would be
a leftist version of populism that identifies the people in
socioeconomic terms as the working-class exploited by
a bourgeois elite or a right-wing populist movement that refers
to ethnonational characteristics to identify the people with the
(ethnic) nation (see
bib15
Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). The
presumed unity of the people also implies that populism
cultivates antagonistic relationships toward those who do not
fit in and therefore threaten the homogeneity. Depending on
the specific nature of the populist image of the people, this
might include, for example, cultural and economic elites,
foreigners, minorities, welfare recipients, or others. It can then
be argued that populism is an inherently antipluralistic ideol-
ogy. Based on these three core elements, scholars present
different, yet overlapping, descriptions.
bib12
Mudde (2004: p. 543)
defines populism as “an ideology that considers society ulti-
mately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic
groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and argues
that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale of
the people.” Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008: p. 3), on the
other hand, conceptualize populism as “an ideology which pits
a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and
dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or
attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights,
values, prosperity, identity and voice.”
p0040Confronted with a great number and diversity of both
movements and (ideological) traits it seems that populism
occurs in various forms (e.g., style, strategy, and core ideolog-
ical attribute), and is not confined to one specific type of
political actor. Not all populists incarnate all the traits that
define pure populism continuously or consistently. The diver-
sity of populist movements is thus accommodated by different
typologies of populism – types differentiated in terms of traits
in the core definition, which they lack. In their groundbreaking
edited volume on populism, Ionescu and Gellner (1969)
already observed that populism was used to refer to actors from
a wide-ranging set of political ideologies. Later,
bib6
Canovan
(1981: p. 133) argued that it was not possible to unite
different populist movements “into a single political
phenomenon with a single ideology, program or socioeco-
nomic base.” Notwithstanding the diversity among populist
parties, several patterns can be distinguished. Populist leaders
in Latin America, for example, tend to be characterized by
a socioeconomically left position, whereas populism in Europe
is often associated with the radical right (
bib15
Mudde and Rovira
Kaltwasser, 2013). In the United States, in turn, populism is
often seen as an intrinsic feature of politics, in view of the more
general wariness of big government and the Washington elite
(see
bib23
Ware, 2002). More recently, the term has often been
associated with the culturally conservative and anti-statist
Tea Party. In organizational terms, populism in Europe is
predominantly seen as a feature of political parties rather than
individuals – even though many of those parties are charac-
terized by centralized leadership and a strong figurehead. Irre-
spective of the general tendency of populism to cohabit with
the xenophobic right, populism in Europe has also been
associated with other ‘party families.’
s0020Populism in Party Families
p0045
bib13
Mudde (2007) has treated populism as a core element of the
populist radical right (PRR), but also identified two other
types of populist parties: neoliberal populists and social
populists (see also
bib11
March, 2011). Parties from the latter two
families are mainly concerned with socioeconomic themes –
promoting free-market economics and welfare protec-
tionism, respectively – while PRR parties are, besides their
populism, primarily characterized by their xenophobia and
cultural conservatism (or: nativism and authoritarianism).
Thus, even though it would not be accurate to speak of
a populist ‘party family,’ because populist parties can come in
various ideological shapes and guises, several party families
can be distinguished for which populism is a defining
characteristic.
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p0050 Again, while there have been prominent examples of
neoliberal populist parties (e.g., those of Silvio Berlusconi in
Italy and Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands) and social populists
(such as Die Linke in Germany and Sinn Fein in the Republic of
Ireland), the majority of the cases of populism in Europe
appear to fall within the PRR category. InWestern Europe, these
parties are for instance characterized by their hostility against
immigration and emphasis on the need for foreigners to adapt
to the nation’s customs. Several such parties have been around
for quite a long time: the Front National (FN) in France was
founded in 1972, the Flemish Interest (previously Flemish
Block, VB) in 1978. Other parties with a longer history have
transformed themselves into successful PRR parties more
recently – the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the Swiss
People’s Party being prime examples. In post-communist
countries in Central and Eastern Europe, where immigration
levels have been low or even negative, ethnic minorities – and
in some countries the Roma population in particular – have
typically been identified as the nonnative elements who
threaten the homogeneity of the people. Examples include
parties such as Jobbik in Hungary, the Greater Romania Party
(PRM), and the Slovak National Party (SNS).
p0055 It must be noted that populism is not necessarily
a phenomenon confined to certain parties only. In Europe, too,
populism can take the form of a more fleeting rhetorical device
used to blame (governing) electoral competitors for having lost
touch with the ‘ordinary people.’ In post-communist countries,
where political trust tends to be low and public sector
corruption is often a salient electoral theme, many (newly
established) political parties have voiced populist antiestab-
lishment rhetoric (
bib22
Van Kessel, 2014). The term populism has
also regularly been used to describe large mainstream parties
such as the Hungarian FIDESZ and the Polish Law and
Justice (PiS).
p0060 The difficulty in pinpointing exactly which actors are
populist or not has added to the concept’s unsystematic use
and the more general conceptual confusion surrounding the
term. Another problem of ‘populism’ is that the term is used
rather randomly as a term of abuse and that populism is,
without much substantiation, often automatically treated as
a phenomenon that threatens the quality of democracy.
s0025 Populism and Democracy
p0065 Populism is regularly applied as a synonym for demagoguery,
simplistic solutions, or opportunism (e.g.,
bib12
Mudde, 2004;
bib21
Taggart, 2000). Especially in the vernacular sphere, the term is
often used pejoratively to refer to vote-winning policy
proposals, attempts to pander to public opinion, or anti-
immigration attitudes (
bib4
Bale et al., 2011). The academic debate
about the concept may be more sophisticated, but also in
scholarly literature, the term is frequently seen as a negative
phenomenon.
bib5
Betz (1994: p. 4), for instance, sees populism as
a means of political opportunism that is unscrupulous and
exploitative of the anxieties of the electorate. Others view
populism’s support for unmediated popular sovereignty as
a threat to liberal democratic ‘checks and balances’ and the
protection of minorities.
bib2
Abts and Rummens (2007: p. 4), for
instance, argued that populism is inherently incompatible with
democracy; populism’s conception of the people as a homo-
geneous body is fictional and “generates a logic which disre-
gards the idea of otherness at the heart of democracy and aims
at the suppression of diversity within society.”
p0070A more optimistic view is that populism is an indicator of
the health of representative or liberal democracy. Although not
denying the risks of populist politics, some scholars argue that
populism emerges when the political elite loses track of the
popular will, or when the ‘constitutional’ or ‘liberal,’ as
opposed to the ‘democratic’ or ‘popular’ pillar of democracy, is
seen to become too dominant. Taggart (2002: p. 63), for
instance, argued that populism acts as a ‘bellwether’ for the
health of representative politics. Mény and Surel (2002: p. 17)
have described populism as “a warning signal about the
defects, limits and weaknesses of representative systems,” and
argue that “in spite of its often unpleasant tones, it may
constitute an effective reminder that democracy is not a given,
but is instead a constant enterprise of adjustment to the
changing needs and values of society.”
bib7
Canovan (1999: p. 11)
speaks about the tension between the ‘pragmatic’ and
‘redemptive’ faces of democracy and argued that “When too
great a gap opens up between haloed democracy and the
grubby business of politics, populists tend to move on to the
vacant territory, promising in place of the dirty world of party
manoeuvring the shining ideal of democracy renewed. Even
from the point of view of pragmatic politics, the vital practices
of contestation and accountability grow weak without the
energy provided by democracy’s inspirational, mobilizing,
redemptive side.”
p0075Still, populism is seldom seen as an unequivocally good
thing. Not many scholars appear to subscribe to
bib10
Laclau’s (2005:
p. 48) argument that populism and democracy are essentially
interchangeable terms and that “the end of populism coincides
with the end of politics.”
bib16
Panizza (2005: p. 30) instead
described populism as a ‘mirror in which democracy can
contemplate itself,’ but argued that ‘populism is neither the
highest form of democracy nor its enemy.’ In the same volume,
bib3
Arditi (2005) argued that populism can appear in three
possible modes: populism as a mode of representation, as
a symptom, or as an underside. The first mode is compatible
with liberal-democratic politics, the second presents a distur-
bance of democracy, whereas the latter entails an actual inter-
ruption of democracy.
bib17
Pasquino (2008: p. 28), in turn, argued
that the appearance of populism is often a sign of a poorly
functioning democratic regime, but that populism, for instance
due to its unrealizable promises, has a negative impact on the
democratic framework itself.
p0080An edited volume by
bib14
Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012)
attempted to test empirically the consequences of populism in
several countries in Europe and the Americas. Based on the
various case studies, the editors concluded that populism can
be a corrective as well as a threat to democracy. Populism can,
for instance, place issues on the agenda which have been
ignored by the political establishment and give voice to
excluded sections of society, but especially in unconsolidated
democracies, can also undermine liberal democratic institu-
tions in view of its monist conception of society and disdain for
‘checks and balances.’
p0085As a consequence, an obvious question is how established
political actors could react to emerging populism. A quick
AU9
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glance reveals that Western Europe is divided about how to
deal with PRR parties. In Italy, Austria, Denmark, and the
Netherlands a rather open and accommodating approach
prevails whereby populist challengers are treated as ordinary
political opponents and forms of cooperation remain possible.
In other countries, such as France and Belgium, institutional
and political actors pursue a much more repressive and
antagonistic approach whereby the populist parties are dele-
gitimized and treated as genuine enemies of the democratic
system (
bib9
Eatwell and Mudde, 2004). Consequently, the public
debate is largely determined by different stances toward the
well-known dilemma of ‘tolerance for the intolerant.’ On the
one hand, the procedural view conceives of democracy as a set of
procedures organizing the struggle for power. In the electoral
marketplace, all opinions and parties are tolerated as long as
they follow the procedural rules. As a result, freedom of
expression and association is almost unlimited. The adherents
of the procedural view propose to treat populist parties as
legitimate opponents in the political struggle, while it would be
inappropriate to challenge political opponents with repressive
rules of exclusion. On the other hand, the substantive view
advocates a more repressive stance toward populism, in case it
leads to extremism. Democratic procedures are not an end in
themselves but only the means for realizing and protecting a set
of substantive democratic values and rights. Consequently, all
political parties are required to underwrite the fundamental
values of freedom, equality, respect, and tolerance. As far as
populists threaten these values, the tolerance for the intolerant
may be limited. In this sense, repressive measures like a cordon
sanitaire, which aim to obstruct extremist parties, are not
allowed but actually required (
bib8
Capoccia, 2007: pp. 55–67).
Instead,
bib19
Rummens and Abts (2010) propose a concentric
containment policy for dealing with populist parties in trying
to overcome the traditional opposition between procedural
and substantive views of democracy. On the procedural side,
this policy emphasizes the importance of tracking all the rele-
vant concerns of citizens in the public sphere, whereas, on the
substantive side, it stresses the need for an adequate filtering
which guarantees the compatibility of actual policies with the
core values of liberty and equality. Their proposed twofold
requirement of tracking and filtering translates into a guideline
of decreasing tolerance toward populists as they approach the
centers of formal decision-making power. The resulting
containment policy listens to populist voters, but puts simul-
taneously unremitting civilizing pressure on populist parties
themselves.
See also: 93003; 93031; 93087.
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